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[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, the Director of its 
Joint Center for Land Use Studies, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of 
Forestry and Environmental Studies.  Ms. Bacher is Staff Attorney for the Land 
Use Law Center at Pace Law School.] 
 
Abstract: In the past, courts generally deferred to legislatures when determining 
whether a law constitutes a regulatory taking.  However, not all regulations are 
treated equal, and different tests apply to different types of regulations.  Types of 
land use actions with a lower threshold of constitutionally include exactions, and 
regulations that apply fixed fee schedules to private landowners.  This article 
combs both federal and New York law to come to the clear determination that 




New York Courts are developing a comprehensive set of tests to determine 
when a regulation, to quote Mr. Justice Holmes, goes “too far” and constitutes a 
taking in violation of the just compensation requirement of the fifth amendment.  
Historically, courts have deferred to the judgments of regulators, presumed the 
constitutionality of land use controls and environmental regulations, and imposed 
a heavy burden of proof on those who contend that a particular regulation is a 
taking. These judicial standards apply to generally applicable regulations, such 
as zoning or wetland regulations, which regulate all similarly situated parcels in 
the community.  Precisely what standards should be applied to regulations that 
single out a few property owners or that impose exactions as conditions on 
development approvals has lacked definition.  
 
Exactions and Takings Jurisprudence 
 
An exaction is a condition imposed on the issuance of a development 
approval that requires the developer to dedicate land to the public, to allow the 
public access to his private land, or to pay a fee in lieu of such requirements. In 
these cases, under U.S. Supreme Court decisions the regulator must show that 
there is an essential nexus between the condition imposed and the public 
purpose that is to be achieved by the condition.  Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  The Court added a “rough proportionality” 
requirement to reviewing exactions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994).  The City of Tigard required a site plan developer to dedicate a portion of 
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her property lying within a 100-year floodplain for the improvement of a storm 
drainage system along a nearby creek and an additional 15-foot strip of land 
adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.  The conditions 
required the owner to convey an easement to the city allowing it and the public 
access to her land.  The landowner objected, claiming that these requirements 
were not calculated to mitigate the impact of the proposed development and, 
therefore, constituted an uncompensated taking.   
 
Citing Nollan, the Court stated that when dedication conditions are 
imposed on a land use permit, they must bear an “essential nexus” to a 
legitimate public objective.  In view of clear findings regarding the seriousness of 
the flooding and traffic problems in the city and along the creek, such a nexus 
was found.  The Court went on to establish, for the first time, a test that is to be 
used to determine “the required degree of connection between the [dedication 
conditions] and the projected impact of the proposed development.”  Dolan, 512 
U.S. at 377. For this purpose, the Court wrote “we think a term such as ‘rough 
proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment.  No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must 
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”  Id. 
at 391 (emphasis added). 
 
In Dolan, the Court found that the City had not shown why a dedicated 
public greenway, rather than a private one, was required in the interest of flood 
control.  In regard to the pedestrian/bicycle path dedication, the Court held that 
the city’s finding that the path “could offset some of the traffic demand” was too 
general.  Id. at 389.  The City did not “meet its burden of demonstrating that the 
additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner’s 
development reasonably relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.”  Id. at 395.  The Court required the City 
to “make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication . . . 
beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand 
generated.” Id. at 395-96.  The imposition of the burden of proof on the regulator, 
the stricter scrutiny used, and the failure to presume the validity of the City’s 
determinations are uniquely applicable to cases where exactions are challenged.  
  
The Supreme Court framed the “rough proportionality” test by adapting a 
“reasonable relationship” test used in several state court decisions referencing 
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608 (1965), Collis v. Bloomington, 310 
Minn. 5 (1976), College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 
1984), and Call v. West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979).  Id. at 390.  In all 
three of these cases property owners challenged the constitutionality of municipal 
ordinances that required subdividers to dedicate land for recreational purposes or 
pay a fee in lieu of such dedication.  The state courts required a showing of a 
reasonable relationship between the planned subdivision and the impact fee or 
land dedication condition imposed.  In Jordan, the fee in lieu of dedication was 
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$200 per lot for all subdivisions because it had determined that land valued at 
$200 per household added to the community was needed to provide the added 
park and school lands.  Jordan, 28 Wis. 2d at 614-15.  In the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s parlance, this standard became known as the rough proportionality 
requirement.  
 
Per-Lot or Per-Household Fixed Fee Schedules 
 
Recently, the Court of Appeals clarified the applicability of the “rough 
proportionality” test to fixed fee schedules that apply to all subdivisions approved 
in the community.  In Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 2003 
N.Y. LEXIS 3949 (November 20, 2003), the Court of Appeals held that the town’s 
fixed recreational fee schedule is not a taking of property without just 
compensation.  Pursuant to Town Law § 277(4) a Town, after making a finding 
that there is an unmet need in the Town for recreational facilities, may require a 
subdivider to provide recreational facilities on site or, if there is no appropriate 
location for such facilities on the site, require the subdivider to make a 
contribution to the locality’s recreational trust fund. This section was enacted by 
the State legislature in recognition that, as development proceeds, land is 
eventually lost that is needed for park and recreational services to citizens.  
Using this authority, the Town of Monroe requires all developers to pay $1,500 
per-lot for a proposed subdivision of five or more lots.  Monroe Town Code § 
26B-2(A)(7).   
 
In Twin Lakes, the Court of Appeals consulted Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 
526 U.S. 687 (1999), to confirm that such fees are exactions.  Twin Lakes 
Development Corp., 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3949 at *7 and *8 n1.  In Monterey, the 
Court declined to extend the strict scrutiny analysis to cases in which the plaintiff 
challenges a denial of a development permit.  In dicta, however, the Court stated 
that “land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication 
of property to public use” and, by extension, fees in lieu of such dedication, are 
exactions.  See Monterey, 526 U.S. at 703. 
 
The petitioner, Twin Lakes Development Corp., an applicant for a subdivision 
permit, was required to pay $33,000 in order to obtain the necessary approvals to 
proceed with its 22 residential lots.  Twin Lakes paid the fee in protest and 
argued that the Town’s fixed recreation fee, applied routinely to all subdivisions, 
did not reflect the type of individualized determination that must be made and 
thus violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s requirement that exactions be reasonably 
proportional to the impacts that they mitigate.  Twin Lakes Development Corp., 
2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3949 at *6. 
 
The Court of Appeals in Twin Lakes addressed the reasonableness of the fee 
amount and found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Town’s fixed fee 
was a taking.  The court found that that the essential nexus existed because the 
Town  “made explicit findings that the demand for recreational facilities exceeded 
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existing resources and that continued subdivision development, paired with the 
‘upward-spiraling land costs,’ would exacerbate the problem.”  Id. at *9. 
 
Given this showing, the court found that Twin Lakes failed to prove that the 
$1,500 fee was not roughly proportional to the impact its development would 
have on the recreational needs of the Town.  The Town found with respect to 
plaintiff’s application that there was a need for recreational opportunities in the 
town and the subdivision would increase this need, but the site was not suitable 
for the development of a park.  “These findings satisfy the requirements of Town 
Law § 277(4)(c) and reflect the individualized consideration of the project’s 
impact contemplated by Dolan.”  Id. at *10.  The Court of Appeals thus found that 





In Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 94 N.Y.2d 96 (1999), 
the plaintiff argued that the rezoning of its large parcel from residential to 
recreational use was a taking because it violated the essential nexus test of 
Nollan.   As a result of the rezoning, plaintiff’s plan to construct a number of 
homes was denied by the Town.  The town had conducted years of studies and 
had documented its need to preserve open space, create recreational 
opportunities, and provide for flood control.  The plaintiff, nonetheless, argued 
that, under the Nollan test, “there is an insufficiently ‘close causal nexus’ between 
the rezoning measures and the legitimate public interests defendants sought to 
achieve.”  Id. at 105.  Although the plaintiff conceded that the Supreme Court, in 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, limited the Dolan “rough proportionality” test to 
exaction cases, the plaintiff maintained that the court must consider the 
“essential nexus” test since the Supreme Court did not expressly limit that text to 
exactions.  In essence, the plaintiffs implied that singling out their large acreage 
along with one other golf course for special treatment was the type of regulation 
to which the stricter judicial rules should apply. 
 
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the Supreme Court, in limiting 
the “rough proportionality” test to exaction cases “necessarily rejected the 
applicability of the ‘essential nexus’ inquiry to general zoning regulations as well.”  
Id. at 107.  In affirming the decision of the Appellate Division, the court held that 
the test from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) remained the proper 
test for a regulatory taking: a regulatory taking occurs when the ordinance does 
not substantially advance a legitimate state interest or when it deprives the owner 
of the economically viable use of his land.     
 
 
 
